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Abstract
A new, comprehensive approach to inhabitation problems in simply-typed lambda-calculus
is shown, dealing with both decision and counting problems. This approach works by exploit-
ing a representation of the search space generated by a given inhabitation problem, which is in
terms of a lambda-calculus for proof search that the authors developed recently. The represen-
tation may be seen as extending the Curry-Howard representation of proofs by lambda-terms,
staying within the methods of lambda-calculus and type systems. Our methodology reveals
inductive descriptions of the decision problems, driven by the syntax of the proof-search
expressions, and the end products are simple, recursive decision procedures and counting
functions.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study inhabitation problems in the simply-typed λ-calculus, by which we mean
both decision problems, like “does type A have an inhabitant?”, and related questions like counting
or listing the inhabitants of a type known to have finitely many of them [Hin97]. We propose a
new approach based on a λ-calculus for proof search that the authors developed recently [EMP13,
EMP16]. This is a λ-calculus with fixed-points and formal sums, here named λgfpΣ , able to represent
as a single term the entire space generated by the search for inhabitants for a given type.
Our previous work showed the correctness of this representation. We could add that such
representation has a special status: it was derived as an inductive, finitary counterpart to the
coinductive characterization of the search process; and the latter is a rather natural (we might say
canonical) mathematical definition of the process which, in addition, may be seen as extending
the Curry-Howard paradigm of representation, from proofs to runs of search processes (all this
will be recalled in Section 2). Furthermore, the finitary representation stays within the methods
of λ-calculus and type systems, which dispenses us from importing and adapting methods from
other areas, like automata and language theory or games [TAH96, BS11, SDB15], or from creating
new representations like in the proof-tree method [BD05, AB15].
Despite these formal merits, the applicability of the finitary representation remains to be
illustrated. This is the purpose of the present paper. Consider a decision problem D and let
A be a type (of simply-typed λ-calculus). Our previous work allowed us (i) to express D(A) as
P (SA), where SA is the coinductive description of the search for inhabitants of A, and P is some
coinductive predicate, and then (ii) to convert to the equivalent P ′(FA), where FA is the finitary
description of SA and P
′ is still a predicate defined by reference to coinductive structures. The
form P ′(FA) does not yet profit from the finitary description. This is what we achieve in the
present paper: one obtains the equivalent P ′′(FA), where P
′′ is inductive, actually directed by the
syntax of the finitary description and, for this reason, immediately decidable (however, this might
∗This work was partially supported by the project Climt, ANR-11-BS02-016, of the French Agence Nationale
de la Recherche.
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call, at the leaves of the inductive structure, another decidable predicate, whose decidability has
been established before with the same method).
We illustrate in Section 3 the methodology with two decision problems: the problem exemplified
above and also “does type A have finitely many inhabitants?”. Next, in Section 4, we study types
A with finitely many inhabitants to show how their number can be calculated from the finitary
description FA as a maybe amazingly simple recursive function.
To sum up: we can base a new methodology to study inhabitation problems on the finitary
representation offered by λgfpΣ which (i) is aligned with the Curry-Howard isomorphism; (ii) enjoys
economy of means, as it finds resources in the area of λ-calculus; (iii) is modular, as it separates
the problems of representing the search space (that exploits the subformula property of the object
λ-calculus) from the problem of analyzing it (where types play a minor role beyond being part of
the annotations of the deployed λ-calculus for the analysis); (iv) produces algorithms and functions
of high simplicity and even beauty.
2 Background
This section has four subsections. First we fix our presentation of the simply-typed λ-calculus,
next we recall our two representations of proof search, developed before in [EMP13, EMP16], and
recast here as search for inhabitants of a given type. Finally, we start introducing new notions
needed in this paper.
2.1 Simply-typed λ-calculus
We lay out a presentation of the simply-typed λ-calculus, a system we often refer to by λ.
Simple types (or simply, types) are given by the grammar:
(types) A,B,C := p | A ⊃ B
where p, q, r range over atoms. We thus do not distinguish types from propositional implicational
formulas. We will write A1 ⊃ A2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Ak ⊃ p, with k ≥ 0, in vectorial notation as ~A ⊃ p. For
example, if the vector ~A is empty the notation means simply p.
Normal (i.e., β-normal) λ-terms are given by:
(terms) t, u ::= λxA.t | x 〈t1, . . . , tk〉
where a countably infinite set of variables, ranged over by letters x, y, w, z, is assumed. Note that
in λ-abstractions we adopt a domain-full presentation (a. k. a. Church-style syntax), annotating
the bound variable with a formula. As is common-place with lambda-calculi, we will throughout
identify terms up to α-equivalence.
As always, we permanently need access to the head variable of a non-abstraction. To this
end, we are using an informal notation, with vectors written 〈t1, . . . , tk〉 (meaning 〈〉 if k =
0), abbreviated 〈ti〉i if there is no ambiguity on the range of indices1. The term constructor
x 〈t1, . . . , tk〉 is usually called application. When n = 0 we may simply write the variable x.
We will view contexts Γ as finite sets of declarations x : A, where no variable x occurs twice.
The context Γ, x : A is obtained from Γ by adding the declaration x : A, and will only be written
if x is not declared in Γ. Context union is written as concatenation Γ,∆ for contexts Γ and ∆
if Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅. The letters Γ, ∆, Θ are used to range over contexts, and the notation dom(Γ)
stands for the set of variables declared in Γ. We will write Γ(x) for the type associated with x
for x ∈ dom(Γ), hence viewing Γ as a function on dom(Γ). Context inclusion Γ ⊆ ∆ is just set
inclusion.
1If we formalized vectors as a separate syntactic class, with a nil vector and a vector constructor, we would get
λ-terms [Her95] and would fall, logically, in a sequent calculus format, as in [Her95, EMP16]. But even in [EMP16],
despite the concern with proof search in the sequent calculus, the formalization of vectors was of little importance.
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Figure 1: Typing rules of λ
Γ, x : A ⊢ t : B
Γ ⊢ λxA.t : A ⊃ B
RIntro
(x : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ Γ ∀i, Γ ⊢ ti : Bi
Γ ⊢ x〈ti〉i : p
LVecIntro
The typing rules are in Fig. 1 and derive sequent Γ ⊢ t : A. LVecIntro presupposes that the
indices for the ti range over 1, . . . , k and that ~B = B1, . . . , Bk, for some k ≥ 0. Such obvious
constraints for finite vectors will not be spelt out in the rest of the paper. In the particular case
of k = 0, in which (x : p) ∈ Γ is the only hypothesis of LVecIntro, we type variables (with atoms).
Note that the conclusion of the LVecIntro rule is an atomic sequent—hence a typable term will
always be in η-long form.
2.2 Search for inhabitants, coinductively
We are concerned with a specific kind of search problems: given Γ and A, to find t such that
Γ ⊢ t : A, that is, to find an inhabitant of type A in context Γ. Under the Curry-Howard
correspondence, a pair Γ, A may be seen as a logical sequent Γ ⇒ A, and searching for an
inhabitant of A in context Γ is the same as searching for a proof of that sequent2.
Following [EMP13, EMP16], we model this search process through the coinductive λ-calculus,
denoted λco. The terms of λco, also called coterms or Bo¨hm trees, are given by
M,N ::=co λx
A.N |x〈N1, . . . , Nk〉 .
This is exactly the previous grammar for λ-terms, but read coinductively, as indicated by the index
co (still with finite tuples 〈Ni〉i). The natural notion of equality between coterms is bisimilarity
modulo α-equivalence. Following mathematical practice, this is still written as plain equality.
In λco, also the typing rules of Fig. 1 have to be interpreted coinductively—but the formu-
las/types stay inductive and the contexts finite. Following common practice, we will symbolize
the coinductive reading of an inference (rule) by the double horizontal line, but we refrain from
displaying Fig. 1 again with double lines—a figure where the two inference rules would be called
RIntroco and LVecIntroco. Such system defines when Γ ⊢ N : A holds for a finite context Γ, a
Bo¨hm tree N and a type A.
Suppose Γ ⊢ N : A holds. Then this sequent has a derivation which is a (possibly infinite) tree
of sequents, generated by applying the inference rules bottom-up; and N is a (possibly infinite)
coterm, which we call a solution of σ, with σ = (Γ ⇒ A). Therefore, such derivations are the
structures generated by the search process which does not fail, even if it runs forever, and so
they subsume proofs; likewise solutions subsume typable terms (so we may refer to the latter
as finite solutions3)—with solutions still representing derivations, even if infinite, following the
Curry-Howard paradigm.
The next step is to extend even further the paradigm, representing also the choice points of
the search process. To this end, we extend λco to λcoΣ , whose syntax is this:
(terms) M,N ::=co λx
A.N |E1 + · · ·+ En
(elimination alternatives) E ::=co x〈N1, . . . , Nk〉
where both n, k ≥ 0 are arbitrary. T ranges over both terms and elimination alternatives. Note
that summands cannot be lambda-abstractions. We will often use
∑
iEi instead of E1+ · · ·+En—
in generic situations or if the dependency of Ei on i is clear, as well as the number of elements (if
this number is 0, we write the sum as O).
2To be precise, a proof in natural deduction, which is equivalent to a cut-free, sequent-calculus proof in the
system LJT [Her95].
3Solutions subsume finite solutions conservatively. In fact, it is easy to prove that, given a λ-term t, Γ ⊢ t : A
in λ iff Γ ⊢ t : A in λco.
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Figure 2: Membership relations
mem(M,N)
mem(λxA.M, λxA.N)
∀i, mem(Mi, Ni)
mem(x〈Mi〉i, x〈Ni〉i)
mem(M,Ej)
mem(M,
∑
iEi)
Figure 3: Extra typing rule of λcoΣ w. r. t. λ
co
∀i, Γ ⊢ Ei : p
Γ ⊢
∑
i Ei : p
Alts
The most natural notion of equality of terms in λcoΣ is again bisimilarity modulo α-equivalence,
but the notation
∑
iEi already hints that we consider + to be associative (with O as its neutral
element). We even want to neglect the precise order of the summands and their (finite) multiplicity.
We thus consider the sums of elimination alternatives as if they were sets of alternatives, i. e., we
further assume that + is symmetric and idempotent. As for λco, we just use mathematical equality
for this notion of bisimilarity on expressions of λcoΣ , and so the sums of elimination alternatives
can plainly be treated as if they were finite sets of elimination alternatives (given by finitely many
elimination alternatives of which several might be identified through bisimilarity).
The expressions of λcoΣ are also called Bo¨hm forests—and a Bo¨hm tree M is a member of a
Bo¨hm forest N when the relation mem(M,N) defined coinductively in Fig. 2 holds.
In the typing system for λcoΣ , one derives sequents Γ ⊢ N : A and Γ ⊢ E : p. The coinductive
typing rules are the ones of λco, together with the rule given in Fig. 3.
A typing derivation of λcoΣ is a possibly infinite tree of sequents, generated by the bottom-up
application of the inference rules, with “multiplicative” branching (logically: “and” branching)
caused by the list of arguments in elimination alternatives, and “additive” branching (logically:
“or” branching) caused by sums—the latter being able to express the alternatives found in the
search process when an atom p can be proved by picking different head variables with their
appropriate arguments. So, it is no surprise that, with this infrastructure, we can express, as
a single Bo¨hm forest, the entire solution space generated by the search process when applied to
given Γ and A. That Bo¨hm forest can be defined as a function S of Γ⇒ A defined by corecursion
as follows:
Definition 1 (Solution spaces)
S(Γ⇒ ~A ⊃ p) := λ~x : ~A.
∑
(y: ~B⊃p)∈∆
y〈S(∆⇒ Bj)〉j with ∆ := Γ, ~x : ~A
The following properties witness the robustness of the definition [EMP13, EMP16].
Proposition 2 (Properties of solution spaces) The following properties hold.
1. Given Γ and A, the typing Γ ⊢ S(Γ⇒ A) : A holds in λcoΣ .
2. For N ∈ λco, mem(N,S(Γ⇒ A)) iff Γ ⊢ N : A in λco.
3. For t ∈ λ, mem(t,S(Γ⇒ A)) iff Γ ⊢ t : A in λ.
2.3 Search for inhabitants, inductively
Unfortunately, algorithms cannot in general receive Bo¨hm forests as input, so the next step is to
find an alternative, equivalent, effective representation that works at least for solution spaces. To
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this end, an extension λgfpΣ of λ is introduced, whose syntax is given by the following grammar
(read inductively):
(terms) N ::= λxA.N | gfp Xσ.E1 + · · ·+ En | Xσ
(elimination alternatives) E ::= x〈N1, . . . , Nk〉
where X is assumed to range over a countably infinite set of fixpoint variables (also letters Y , Z
will range over them), and where, as for λcoΣ , both n, k ≥ 0 are arbitrary. We extend our practice
established for λcoΣ of writing the sums E1 + · · · + En in the form
∑
iEi for n ≥ 0. Also the
tuples continue to be communicated as 〈Ni〉i. As for λcoΣ , we will identify expressions modulo
associativity, symmetry and idempotence of +, thus treating sums of elimination alternatives as if
they were the set of those elimination alternatives. Again, we will write T for expressions of λgfpΣ ,
i. e., for terms and elimination alternatives.
In the term formation rules, σ in Xσ is required to be atomic, i. e., of the form Γ ⇒ p.
Let FPV (T ) denote the set of free occurrences of typed fixed-point variables in T . Perhaps
unexpectedly, in gfp Xσ.
∑
iEi the fixed-point construction gfp binds all free occurrences of X
σ′
in the elimination alternatives Ei, not just X
σ. But we only want this to happen when σ ≤ σ′—
which means: the context of σ′ has more declarations than that of σ, but not with new types.
Formally: σ = (Γ⇒ p), σ′ = (Γ′ ⇒ p) and Γ ≤ Γ′, with the latter meaning Γ ⊆ Γ′ but |Γ| = |Γ′|,
and |∆| denoting {A | ∃x, (x : A) ∈ ∆} for arbitrary context ∆.
In the sequel, when we refer to finitary terms we have in mind the expressions of λgfpΣ . The
fixed-point operator is called gfp (“greatest fixed point”) to indicate that its semantics is—see
below—defined in terms of the infinitary syntax λcoΣ , but there, fixed points are unique. Hence,
the reader may just read this as “the fixed point”.
We now move to the interpretation of expressions of λgfpΣ in terms of the coinductive syntax
of λcoΣ (using the ν operation on the meta-level to designate unique fixed points). It is done with
the help of environments ξ, which are partial functions from typed fixed-point variables Xσ to
(co)terms of λcoΣ , with domain dom(ξ) a finite set of typed fixpoint variables without duplicates,
which means: Xσ1 , Xσ2 ∈ dom(ξ)⇒ σ1 = σ2.
Some technicalities are needed before giving the interpretation. We say an environment ξ is
admissible for an expression T of λgfpΣ if, for every X
σ′ ∈ FPV (T ), there is an Xσ ∈ dom(ξ) such
that σ ≤ σ′. It is easy to see that T admits an environment iff it is regular in the following sense:
if X occurs free in T , there is a sequent σ that is the minimum of all σ′ such that Xσ
′
∈ FPV (T ).
Finally, the interpretation is only given for well-bound expressions, where T ∈ λgfpΣ is well-bound
if, for any of its subterms gfp Xσ.
∑
i Ei and any (free) occurrence of X
σ′ in the Ei’s, σ ≤ σ′.
Definition 3 (Interpretation of finitary terms as Bo¨hm forests) For a well-bound expres-
sion T of λgfpΣ , the interpretation [[T ]]ξ for an environment ξ that is admissible for T is given by
structural recursion on T :
[[Xσ
′
]]ξ = [σ
′/σ]ξ(Xσ) for the unique σ ≤ σ′ with Xσ ∈ dom(ξ)
[[gfp Xσ.
∑
i
Ei]]ξ = ν N.
∑
i
[[Ei]]ξ∪[Xσ 7→N ]
[[λxA.N ]]ξ = λx
A.[[N ]]ξ
[[x〈Ni〉i]]ξ = x〈[[Ni]]ξ〉i
If T is closed, i. e., FPV (T ) = ∅, then the empty function is an admissible environment for T , and
we write [[T ]].
The clause for fixpoint variables in the preceding definition has to cope with σ ≤ σ′. This
is done by adjusting the value N = ξ(Xσ) looked up in the environment with an operation on
Bo¨hm forests which will add elimination alternatives to the sums in N , in order to match the new
declarations in σ′. If σ = (Γ⇒ p) and σ′ = (Γ′ ⇒ p), then [σ′/σ]N is defined to be [Γ′/Γ]N , with
the latter given as follows:
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Definition 4 (Co-contraction) Let Γ ≤ Γ′. For T an expression of λcoΣ , we define [Γ
′/Γ]T by
corecursion as follows:
[Γ′/Γ](λxA.N) = λxA.[Γ′/Γ]N
[Γ′/Γ]
∑
i
Ei =
∑
i
[Γ′/Γ]Ei
[Γ′/Γ]
(
z〈Ni〉i
)
= z〈[Γ′/Γ]Ni〉i if z /∈ dom(Γ)
[Γ′/Γ]
(
z〈Ni〉i
)
=
∑
(w:A)∈∆z
w〈[Γ′/Γ]Ni〉i if z ∈ dom(Γ)
where, in the last clause, A := Γ(z) and ∆z := {(z : A)} ∪ (Γ′ \ Γ).
Co-contraction captures the extension of the solution space when going from σ to some σ′ with
σ ≤ σ′:
Lemma 5 (Solution spaces and co-contraction) Let σ ≤ σ′. Then S(σ′) = [σ′/σ]S(σ).
With the finitary calculus and its semantics in place, we can provide an alternative represen-
tation F(σ) of the search space generated by a sequent σ.
Definition 6 (Finitary solution space) Let Ξ :=
−−−−−−−→
X : Θ⇒ q be a vector of m ≥ 0 declarations
(Xi : Θi ⇒ qi) where no fixpoint variable name and no sequent occurs twice. The specification of
F(Γ⇒ ~A ⊃ p; Ξ) is as follows:
If, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, p = qi and Θi ⊆ Γ and |Θi| = |Γ| ∪ {A1, . . . , An}, then
F(Γ⇒ ~A ⊃ p; Ξ) = λzA11 · · · z
An
n .X
σ
i ,
where i is taken to be the biggest such index. Otherwise,
F(Γ⇒ ~A ⊃ p; Ξ) = λzA11 · · · z
An
n .gfp Y
σ.
∑
(y: ~B⊃p)∈∆
y〈F(∆⇒ Bj ; Ξ, Y : σ)〉j
where, in both cases, ∆ := Γ, z1 : A1, . . . , zn : An and σ := ∆⇒ p.
F(σ) denotes F(σ; Ξ) with empty Ξ. It can be proved that: (i) F(σ) is well-defined (the above
recursive definition terminates); (ii) F(σ) is a closed well-bound term.
The semantics into λcoΣ of the finitary representation coincides with S(σ) [EMP13, EMP16].
Theorem 7 (Equivalence) For any sequent σ, [[F(σ)]] = S(σ).
2.4 The finite extension
We now introduce some notions pertaining to the present paper, given its focus on finite inhabitants
(i.e., λ-terms).
For T ∈ λcoΣ , we call finite extension of T , which we denote by Efin(T ), the set of the finite
members of T , i. e., Efin(T ) = {t ∈ λ | mem(t, T )}. We will be mainly interested in the following
predicates on Bo¨hm forests concerning the finite extension:
• exfinext(T ) is defined to hold iff Efin(T ) is nonempty.
• nofinext(T ) is defined to hold iff Efin(T ) is empty.
• finfinext(T ) is defined to hold iff Efin(T ) is finite.
• inffinext(T ) is defined to hold iff Efin(T ) is infinite.
The predicates exfinext and finfinext will be characterized inductively in Sect. 3.2 and in Sect. 3.3,
respectively, together with coinductive characterizations of nofinext and inffinext by the generic De
Morgan’s law relating least and greatest fixed points.
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3 The inhabitation problems
We will study two decision problems in simply-typed λ-calculus: the inhabitation problem and
the type finiteness problem. First, we lay down the common approach we will adopt.
Given Γ and A, we will write I(Γ, A) for the set of inhabitants of A relative to context Γ in
λ, i. e., for the set {t ∈ λ | Γ ⊢ t : A in λ}. Recall that this describes the set of η-long β-normal
terms of ordinary simply-typed λ-calculus receiving type A in context Γ.
The inhabitation problem in simply-typed λ-calculus is the problem “given Γ and A, is the set
I(Γ, A) nonempty?”, called INHAB in this paper. Its negation is called the “emptiness problem” (as
is well-known, the answer to this question does not depend on whether all λ-terms are considered
or only the β-normal ones or even the η-long β-normal terms). Decidability of the inhabitation
problem in simply-typed λ-calculus is a well-known result (see, e. g., [Sta79]).
Lemma 8 (Characterization of existence of inhabitants in λ) There is a t ∈ λ such that
Γ ⊢ t : A in λ iff exfinext([[F(Γ⇒ A)]]).
Proof ∃t ∈ λ s. t. Γ ⊢ t : A in λ
iff ∃t ∈ λ s. t. mem(t,S(Γ⇒ A)) (Prop. 2.3)
iff ∃t ∈ λ s. t. mem(t, [[F(Γ⇒ A)]]) (Theorem 7)
iff exfinext([[F(Γ⇒ A)]]) (by definition of exfinext) 
As seen above, the function F is effectively computable, and it yields closed well-bound finitary
terms. The missing link to deciding INHAB is thus the decision of the problem “given a closed
well-bound term T , does exfinext([[T ]]) hold?”. Of course, one cannot deal with closed finitary
terms T in isolation and needs to address fixpoint variables properly. Neither the interpretation
function [[·]] nor the predicate exfinext are effective, but we will define in Section 3.2 a syntax-
directed predicate EF (more precisely, it will be a predicate EFP parameterized over a decidable
predicate P ) on finitary terms that is equivalent to the composition exfinext◦ [[·]], for at least those
closed well-bound terms that arise as F(σ) for some sequent σ (technically, the restriction will
be to proper terms, as defined in Section 3.1). Syntax-directedness immediately entails that the
predicate is decidable.
The appeal of our approach is that, once the finitary representation of the corresponding
sequent has been built as F(σ), the decision of inhabitation is achieved through a simple recursive
function over the structure of λgfpΣ -terms, corresponding to an inductive predicate adequately
characterizing non-emptiness of types.
Using the same methodology, we can also reprove a more difficult and not so well-known result
of inhabitation for simply-typed λ-calculus, namely, that the problem “given Γ and A, is the
set I(Γ, A) finite?” is decidable (see, e. g. [Hir98]). This problem—henceforth called FINHAB—
depends on studying only β-normal terms; to recall, the inhabitants of our system λ are η-long
β-normal simply-typed λ-terms, for which the problem is studied in the literature [Hin97] (there,
in particular, the algorithm by Ben-Yelles [BY79]).
Lemma 9 (Characterization of type finiteness in λ) The set of inhabitants I(Γ, A) is finite
iff finfinext([[F(Γ⇒ A)]]).
Proof Analogous to the proof of Lemma 8, following from Prop. 2.3, Theorem 7 and definition
of finfinext. 
Analogously to the emptiness problem, our method for establishing decidability of FINHAB is
to define a recursive predicate on finitary terms that is equivalent to the composition finfinext◦ [[·]],
for at least those closed well-bound terms that arise as F(σ) for some sequent σ (with the same
technical condition as for the emptiness problem). This will be the predicate FF (again, rather
a parameterized predicate FFP ), studied in Sect. 3.3. Again, the appeal of our approach is that,
after building the finitary representation of the corresponding sequent through the F(σ) function,
FINHAB is decided by a simple function given recursively over the structure of λgfpΣ -terms, which,
however, additionally uses the previously established decision algorithm for INHAB.
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In both cases, the problem is of the form P ◦ S on sequents, and thanks to S = [[·]] ◦ F and
associativity, we have to decide (P ◦ [[·]]) ◦ F , where F is already computable. The solution is by
proposing a recursive predicate P ′ that can step in for P ◦ [[·]], as far the image of F is concerned
(specifically, those terms are well-bound, have no free fixpoint variables and are proper in the sense
of Definition 11 below). Finally, the decision is done by deciding P ′ ◦ F .
We will carry out the two instances of this programme, but for this, it will prove useful to
simplify our semantics of finitary terms.
3.1 A simplified semantics
We introduce a simplified interpretation of expressions of λgfpΣ in terms of the coinductive syntax
of λcoΣ . We now dispense with environments and adopt a simpler and even possibly “wrong”
interpretation, which, however, for λgfpΣ -terms representing solution spaces will be seen to be
equivalent.
Definition 10 (Simplified interpretation of finitary terms as Bo¨hm forests) For an ex-
pression T of λgfpΣ , the simplified interpretation [[T ]]
s is given by structural recursion on T :
[[Xσ]]s = S(σ)
[[gfp Xσ.
∑
i
Ei]]
s =
∑
i
[[Ei]]
s
[[λxA.N ]]s = λxA.[[N ]]s
[[x〈Ni〉i]]s = x〈[[Ni]]s〉i
Note that the base case now profits from the sequent annotation at fixpoint variables, and the
interpretation of the gfp-constructor dispenses with the use of the ν operation on the meta-level
to designate unique fixed points on λcoΣ -expressions. Of course, this may be “wrong” according to
our understanding of a greatest fixed point.
Below, we will be specially interested in the finitary terms which guarantee that a gfpXσ
construction represents the solution space of σ.
Definition 11 (Proper expressions) An expression T ∈ λgfpΣ is proper if for any of its subterms
T ′ of the form gfp Xσ.
∑
i
Ei, it holds that [[T
′]]s = S(σ).
This means that an expression T is considered proper if, despite having used the simplified
definition of semantics for the embedded fixed points, those subterms have the “proper” semantics,
and this is only expressed with respect to our main question of representing solution spaces, hence
where for the fixed-point variables, the reference semantics of solution spaces is assumed, and this
is possible since the fixed-point variables carry the sequent whose solution space they are intended
to represent.
For proper expressions, the simplified semantics agrees with the semantics we studied before.
Of course, this can only make sense for expressions which have that previous semantics, in other
words for well-bound and regular expressions.
Lemma 12 Let T be well-bound and ξ be an admissible environment for T such that for all
Xσ ∈ dom(ξ): ξ(Xσ) = S(σ). If T is proper, then [[T ]]ξ = [[T ]]s.
We remark that for any regular T , there is exactly one such environment ξ. The case of a closed
expression T merits stating a corollary.
Corollary 13 For well-bound, closed and proper T , [[T ]] = [[T ]]s.
Proof (of Lemma 12) By induction on expressions T . The variable case needs Lemma 5, lambda-
abstraction and tuples are fine by the induction hypothesis. For the gfp case, it has to be shown that
[[T ]]s fulfills the fixed-point equation defining [[T ]]ξ, which suffices by uniqueness of the solution. The
induction hypothesis can be applied to the elimination alternatives since the extended environment
in which they have to be interpreted is of the required form, just by T being proper. 
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Figure 4: exfin predicate and nofin predicate
exfin(N)
exfin(λxA.N)
exfin(Ej)
exfin(
∑
i Ei)
∀i, exfin(Ni)
exfin(x〈Ni〉i)
nofin(N)
nofin(λxA.N)
∀i, nofin(Ei)
nofin(
∑
iEi)
nofin(Nj)
nofin(x〈Ni〉i)
The corollary is sufficient for our purposes since F(σ) is not only well-bound and closed, but
also proper, as will be seen shortly.
Theorem 14 (Equivalence for simplified semantics) Let σ be a sequent and Ξ as in Def. 6
so that F(σ; Ξ) exists (in particular, this holds for empty Ξ).
1. F(σ; Ξ) is proper.
2. [[F(σ; Ξ)]]s = S(σ).
Proof Both items together by structural induction on the term F(σ; Ξ). This all goes by unfolding
the definitions and use of the induction hypothesis (the main case in the proof of 1 needs 2 for
the subterms, so 1 cannot be proven separately before 2, and the main case of 2 immediately
follows from the main case of 1, so it is better to prove both together, although 2 could be proven
separately before 1). 
We remark that the proof is a simplification of the proof for Theorem 7 given previously [EMP16].
3.2 Deciding type emptiness
We introduce predicate nofin(T ), for T an expression of λcoΣ (Bo¨hm forest), which holds iff nofinext(T ),
i. e., if the finite extension of T is empty, but it is defined co-inductively in Fig. 4, together (but
independently) with the inductive definition of the predicate exfin(T ) that is supposed to mean
the negation of nofin(T ), but which is expressed positively as existence of a finite member (i. e.,
that the finite extension is non-empty—that exfinext(T ) holds).
Lemma 15 Given a Bo¨hm forest T , exfin(T ) iff nofin(T ) does not hold.
Proof See the appendix. 
The following lemma shows that the predicate nofin corresponds to the intended meaning in
terms of the finite extension. Additionally, the lemma shows that the negation of nofin holds
exactly for the Bo¨hm forests which have finite members.
Lemma 16 (Coinductive characterization) Given a Bo¨hm forest T . Then, nofin(T ) iff Efin(T )
is empty, i. e., nofin = nofinext as sets of Bo¨hm forests.
Proof First, let inf(M) be defined coinductively, as belonging to the greatest predicate inf
satisfying
inf(λxA.M)⇔ inf(M) and inf(x〈Mi〉i)⇔ ∃j, inf(Mj)
This is a characterization of infinity: for a Bo¨hm tree M , M is a λ-term iff inf(M) does not hold.
Now, the statement of the lemma is equivalent to: nofin(T ) iff inf(M) for all M s. t. mem(M,T ).
The “only if” is equivalently to: if nofin(T ) and mem(M,T ) then inf(M). This is provable by
coinduction on inf, using the obvious mem(M,M) for M in λco. The “if” implication is suitable
for coinduction on nofin, and this works smoothly. 
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Figure 5: EFP predicate and 6EFP predicate
P (σ)
EFP (X
σ)
EFP (N)
EFP (λx
A.N)
EFP (Ej)
EFP (gfpX
σ.
∑
iEi)
∀i, EFP (Ni)
EFP (x〈Ni〉i)
¬P (σ)
6EFP (Xσ)
6EFP (N)
6EFP (λxA.N)
∀i, 6EFP (Ei)
6EFP (gfpXσ.
∑
i Ei)
6EFP (Nj)
6EFP (x〈Ni〉i)
Thus, we are authorized to work with nofin and exfin in place of their “extensional variants” nofinext
and exfinext.
Next we turn to finitary representation of solution spaces and consider the predicate EF(T ), for
T an expression in λgfpΣ , which should hold when there is a finite solution. It is not obvious from the
outset if free fixpoint variables should be considered as contributing to these finite solutions. If one
already knows that exfin(S(σ)) holds, then it would be reasonable to put Xσ into the predicate EF.
However, since our aim is to prove exfin ◦ S decidable through decidability of EF, we cannot base
rules for EF on a decision concerning exfin ◦ S. Still, once we established decidability of exfin ◦ S,
we could profit from a definition of EF that is sharp in the sense of containing variables Xσ by
definition if and only if exfin(S(σ)). And this we will do in Section 3.3, building more complex
predicates from EF.
We therefore consider a parameterized notion EFP with P a predicate on sequents and instan-
tiate it twice, with
• once P := ∅, the empty predicate which is trivially decidable, and,
• once exfin ◦ S is proven decidable, with P := exfin ◦ S.
The general proviso on P is decidability of P and that, for all sequents σ, P (σ) implies exfin(S(σ)),
i. e., P ⊆ exfin ◦ S. This proviso is trivially satisfied in both instantiations.4 There are still other
meaningful parameter settings, e. g., with P (σ) iff σ = (Γ ⇒ p) is instance of an axiom, i. e.,
p ∈ |Γ|.
The definition of this (parameterized) predicate EFP is inductive and presented in the first line
of Fig. 5, although it is clear that it could equivalently be given by a definition by recursion over
the term structure. Therefore, the predicate EFP is decidable.
The inductive characterization of the negation of the predicate EFP is easy, as all the rules of
EFP are “invertible”, and is given in the second line of Fig. 5.
Lemma 17 For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , 6EFP (T ) iff EFP (T ) does not hold.
Proposition 18 (Finitary characterization) Let P satisfy P ⊆ exfin ◦ S (this is part of the
general proviso on P ).
1. If EFP (T ) then exfin([[T ]]
s).
2. Let T ∈ λgfpΣ be well-bound and proper. If 6EFP (T ) and for all X
σ ∈ FPV (T ), exfin(S(σ))
implies P (σ), then nofin([[T ]]s).
Proof
1. is proved by induction on the predicate EFP (or, equivalently, on T ). The base case for
fixed-point variables needs the proviso on P , and all other cases are immediate by the induction
hypothesis.
4In a previous version of this paper, P was accidentally set to the always true predicate, in order to solve a
problem of extensionality of a predicate that was used to deal with FINHAB. That was an error and led to incorrect
proofs. We found this out by ourselves, but we also received a counterexample from Micha l Ziobro in January 2017
which we gratefully acknowledge.
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Figure 6: finfin predicate and inffin predicate
nofin(N)
finfin(λxA.N)
finfin(N)
finfin(λxA.N)
∀i, finfin(Ei)
finfin(
∑
iEi)
nofin(Nj)
finfin(x〈Ni〉i)
∀i, finfin(Ni)
finfin(x〈Ni〉i)
exfin(N) inffin(N)
inffin(λxA.N)
inffin(Ej)
inffin(
∑
iEi)
∀i, exfin(Ni) inffin(Nj)
inffin(x〈Ni〉i)
2. is proved by induction on the predicate 6EFP (or, equivalently, on T )—the case relative to
fixpoints is based on T being proper and needs an inner co-induction and also the fact that exfin
is invariant under co-contraction. For details, see the appendix. 
Theorem 19 (Decidability of existence of inhabitants in λ)
1. Let P satisfy P ⊆ exfin ◦ S (this is part of the general proviso on P ). For any T ∈ λgfpΣ
well-bound, proper and closed, EFP (T ) iff exfin([[T ]]
s).
2. exfin(S(σ)) is decidable, by deciding EF∅(F(σ)).
3. In other words, INHAB is decidable.
Proof 1. Follows from both parts of Prop. 18, Lemmas 15 and 17, and the fact that, trivially,
the extra condition in Prop. 18.2 is satisfied for closed terms.
2. Apply 1. with both parts of Theorem 14.
3. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 8, apply Prop. 2.3 (and exfinext = exfin). 
Definition 20 Let the predicates EF⋆ and 6EF⋆ on λ
gfp
Σ be defined by EF⋆ := EFP and 6EF⋆ := 6EFP
for P := exfin ◦ S, which satisfies the proviso by Theorem 19.2. In particular, EF⋆ and 6EF⋆ are
decidable.
Prop. 18.2 gives that 6EF⋆(T ) implies nofin([[T ]]s) for all well-bound and proper expressions T .
However, an inspection of the proof of that lemma even shows that the latter two properties are
not needed:
Lemma 21 (Sharp finitary characterization) For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , EF⋆(T ) iff exfin([[T ]]
s).
Proof See the appendix. 
In particular, exfin([[T ]]s) is decidable, by deciding EF⋆(T ).
3.3 Deciding type finiteness
Now a second and more difficult instance of the programme laid out in the beginning of Section 3.
We will now characterize the predicate finfinext by an inductively defined predicate finfin. Gener-
ically, we will obtain a characterization of its negation inffinext by the coinductively defined dual
inffin of finfin. The inductive definition of finfin is given in the first line of Fig. 6. Notice that, while
finfin is inductively defined and has only finitely many premisses in each clause, there is absolutely
no claim on decidability since the coinductively defined predicate nofin enters the premisses.
By inversion (decomposing the summands into tuples) on nofin, one can show that nofin ⊆ finfin
(which corresponds semantically to the trivial nofinext ⊆ finfinext). Thus, in particular, no clause
pertaining to nofin is necessary for the definition of finfin(
∑
i Ei). We now show that finfin is sound
and complete in terms of membership.
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Lemma 22 (Coinductive characterization) Given a Bo¨hm forest T . Then, finfin(T ) iff Efin(T )
is finite, i. e., finfin = finfinext as sets of Bo¨hm forests.
Proof The direction from left to right (“soundness”) is immediate by induction on finfin, using
Lemma 16. From right to left, we do induction on the sum of the term heights of all finite members,
which is a finite measure. The first and fourth rule of finfin are necessary to capture the cases
when one passes from λ-abstractions to their bodies resp. from tuples to their components—thus
when the individual heights decrease—but when there is just no element whose height decreases.
The case of sums of elimination alternatives needs a further decomposition into tuples, in order to
be able to apply the inductive hypothesis. 
Combined with Lemma 16, this gives an alternative proof of nofin ⊆ finfin.
The announced coinductive definition inffin that is meant to characterize inffinext is found in
the second line of Fig. 6.
Lemma 23 Given a Bo¨hm forest T , finfin(T ) iff inffin(T ) does not hold.
Proof See the appendix. 
As a corollary, we obtain inffin = inffinext as sets of Bo¨hm forests.
Now we introduce two predicates on expressions of λgfpΣ which will allow to characterize type
finiteness, with the following intuitive meanings:
1. FFP (T ): there are only finitely many finite members of T (the case of no finite members is
included in this formulation);
2. 6FFP (T ): there are infinitely many finite members of T .
Here, the predicate P on sequents controls the case of fixpoint variables, as before for EFP and
6EFP . The general proviso on P is that it is decidable and that for all sequents σ, P (σ) implies
finfin(S(σ)), i. e., P ⊆ finfin◦S. For our main result, it will be sufficient to take P := ∅. In view of
the decidability result of the previous section, another possibility of choosing the predicate would
be with P := nofin ◦ S, i. e., with the negation of the predicate underlying the definition of EF⋆
and 6EF⋆.
5
The definitions of these predicates are inductive, and they are presented in Fig. 7. Analogously
to the predicates EFP and 6EFP , it is clear that they could equivalently be defined recursively over
the term structure, thus ensuring their decidability, thanks to decidability of EF⋆.
Lemma 24 For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , 6FFP (T ) iff FFP (T ) does not hold.
Proof Routine induction on T , using Lemma 17. 
Proposition 25 (Finitary characterization) Let P satisfy P ⊆ finfin ◦ S (this is part of the
general proviso on P ).
1. If FFP (T ) then finfin([[T ]]
s).
2. Let T ∈ λgfpΣ be well-bound and proper. If 6FFP (T ) and for all X
σ ∈ FPV (T ), finfin(S(σ))
implies P (σ), then inffin([[T ]]s).
Proof Both statements are proven by induction on T (or, equivalently, by induction on the
respective predicate in the premiss). While 1. is straightforward, for 2. the case relative to
fixpoints is based on T being proper and needs an inner co-induction and also the fact that finfin
is invariant under co-contraction. For details (on both parts), see the appendix. 
5For this specific setting of P , we could easily establish 6FFP ⊆ EF⋆ or, equivalently, 6EF⋆ ⊆ FFP , by induction.
This would allow to remove the condition EF⋆(Nj) from the tuple rule for 6FFP .
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Figure 7: FFP predicate and 6FFP predicate
P (σ)
FFP (X
σ)
FFP (N)
FFP (λx
A.N)
∀i, FFP (Ei)
FFP (gfpX
σ.
∑
i Ei)
∀i, FFP (Ni)
FFP (x〈Ni〉i)
6EF⋆(Nj)
FFP (x〈Ni〉i) and
6FFP (Nj) ∀i, EF⋆(Ni)
6FFP (x〈Ni〉i)
¬P (σ)
6FFP (Xσ)
6FFP (N)
6FFP (λxA.N)
6FFP (Ej)
6FFP (gfpXσ.
∑
iEi)
With these preparations in place, the problem FINHAB can be solved in the same way as
INHAB.
Theorem 26 (Decidability of type finiteness in λ)
1. Let P satisfy P ⊆ finfin ◦ S (this is part of the general proviso on P ). For any T ∈ λgfpΣ
well-bound, proper and closed, FFP (T ) iff finfin([[T ]]
s).
2. finfin(S(σ)) is decidable, by deciding FF∅(F(σ)).
3. In other words, FINHAB is decidable.
Proof 1. Follows from both parts of Prop. 25, Lemmas 23 and 24, and the fact that, trivially,
the extra condition in Prop. 25.2 is satisfied for closed terms.
2. Apply 1. with both parts of Theorem 14.
3. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 9, apply Prop. 2.3 (and finfinext = finfin). 
Definition 27 Let the predicates FF⋆ and 6FF⋆ on λ
gfp
Σ be defined by FF⋆ := FFP and 6FF⋆ := 6FFP
for P := finfin ◦ S, which satisfies the proviso by Theorem 26.2. In particular, FF⋆ and 6FF⋆ are
decidable.
Prop. 25.2 gives that 6FF⋆(T ) implies inffin([[T ]]s) for all well-bound and proper expressions T .
Again (as for Lemma 21), an inspection of the proof of that proposition even shows that the latter
two properties are not needed:
Lemma 28 (Sharp finitary characterization) For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , FF⋆(T ) iff finfin([[T ]]
s).
In particular, finfin([[T ]]s) is decidable, by deciding FF⋆(T ).
4 Counting normal inhabitants
The method of the preceding section is not confined to the mere decision problems. In particular,
instead of only deciding FINHAB, the finitely many inhabitants can be effectively obtained. We
will illustrate this with some detail for the somehow more basic question of determining their
number. The function for obtaining the set of inhabitants then follows the same pattern.
We have considered Bo¨hm forests throughout the paper modulo idempotence of the summation
operation (among other identifications). This does not hinder us from counting the number of
finite members in case it is finite. The finite members themselves are “concrete”, and the only
identification that is not expressed in the grammar of λ is α-equivalence. However, we would
prefer counting summand-wise and thus need to be sure that finite members do not belong to
more than one summand in a sum, and this by taking into account that occurrences are identified
up to bisimulation. Technically, this desideratum is achieved by considering a subset of Bo¨hm
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forests that we call head-variable controlled. The set HλcoΣ of head-variable controlled Bo¨hm
forests is obtained by the same grammar of terms and elimination alternatives as λcoΣ , but with
the restriction for the formation of
∑
i Ei with Ei = xi〈N
i
j〉j that the xi are pairwise different,
i. e., no variable is head of two summands in one sum, and this recursively throughout the Bo¨hm
forest. If we consider this restriction in our view of sums as sets of elimination alternatives, this
only means that a given head variable cannot appear with two distinct tuples of arguments but
still can appear multiply. So, in order to profit from the extra property of Bo¨hm forests in HλcoΣ ,
we regard sums as functions from a finite set of (head) variables x into finite tuples of Bo¨hm forest
headed by x and use the associated notion of bisimilarity (modulo α-equivalence). This means,
when we speak about head-variable controlled Bo¨hm forests, we not only consider Bo¨hm forests
satisfying this extra property, but also their presentation in this form that takes profit from it.
This change of view does not change the notion of bisimilarity. Notice that S(σ) and F(σ) always
yield head-variable controlled terms, in the respective term systems.
We define the counting function # for head-variable controlled Bo¨hm forests in finfin only, by
recursion on finfin.
Definition 29 (Infinitary counting function # : HλcoΣ ∩ finfin→ N)
#(λxA.N) :=
{
0 if nofin(N)
#(N) else
#(
∑
iEi) :=
∑
i #(Ei)
#(x〈Ni〉i) :=
{
0 if ∃j, nofin(Nj)∏
i #(Ni) else
Lemma 30 Let T ∈ HλcoΣ . If nofin(T ) (in particular, finfin(T )) then #(T ) = 0.
Proof Neither induction on T nor on nofin are available. The proof is by case analysis, where
one has to use that elimination alternatives are tuples. 
While this lemma might allow to remove the case distinction in the λ-abstraction case, the second
branch of the tuple case would replace the first one only with a very non-strict reading of the
product that would have to be defined and be of value 0 as soon as one of the factors is 0.
The following lemma can be considered a refinement of the soundness part of Lemma 22.
Lemma 31 Let T be a head-variable controlled Bo¨hm forest such that finfin(T ). Then, #(T ) is a
well-defined natural number, and it is the cardinality of Efin(T ).
Proof Notice that the clause for sums of elimination alternatives is subject to the presentation
we convened for elements of HλcoΣ , and thus the value is invariant under our identifications. The
recursive calls to # occur only with Bo¨hm forests that enter finfin “earlier”. Being the correct
number depends on Lemma 16. 
Since we have also considered the elements of λgfpΣ throughout the paper modulo idempotence of
the summation operation, we will analogously introduce the set HλgfpΣ of head-variable controlled
elements. Again, this is not only a subset but comes with a different presentation of sums as
functions from a finite set of (head) variables x into finite tuples of finitary terms headed by x.
Definition 32 (Finitary counting function # : HλgfpΣ → N) Define by recursion over the term
structure
#(Xσ) := 0
#(λxA.N) := #(N)
#(gfpXσ.
∑
iEi) :=
∑
i #(Ei)
#(x〈Ni〉i) :=
∏
i #(Ni)
Lemma 33 Let T ∈ HλgfpΣ ∩ 6EF⋆. Then #(T ) = 0.
Proof Obvious induction, see the appendix. 
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Proposition 34 Let P ⊆ nofin ◦ S and T ∈ HλgfpΣ ∩ FFP . Then #(T ) = #([[T ]]
s).
Proof The proof is by induction on T (equivalently, by induction on FFP ), using Lemma 33 for
the last rule of FFP , see the appendix. 
Theorem 35 (Counting theorem) Let P ⊆ nofin◦S (e. g., P = ∅). If FFP (F(σ)) then #(F(σ))
is the cardinality of Efin(S(σ)).
Proof F(σ) ∈ HλgfpΣ . By the preceding proposition, using the assumption that FFP (F(σ)), we
obtain #(F(σ)) = #([[F(σ)]]s), which is #(S(σ)) by Theorem 14. Thanks to Proposition 25.1,
finfin(S(σ)), hence, by Lemma 31, #(S(σ)) is the cardinality of Efin(S(σ)). 
Notice that when FFP (F(σ)) does not hold, then #(F(σ)) is meaningless, but 6FFP (F(σ)) holds,
and thus, inffin(S(σ)), which ensures an infinite number of finite solutions of σ.
Without any extra effort, we can give an effective definition of the associated set of finite
inhabitants through a function C : HλgfpΣ → Pfin(λ) by
C(Xσ) := ∅
C(λxA.N) := {λxA.t | t ∈ C(N)}
C(gfpXσ.
∑
i Ei) := ∪i C(Ei)
C(x〈Ni〉i) := {x〈ti〉i | ∀i, ti ∈ C(Ni)}
Then, for T ∈ HλgfpΣ , #(T ) is the cardinality of C(T ) (notice that the set union in the gfp case is
always a disjoint union), and if FF∅(F(Γ ⇒ A)) then I(Γ, A) = C(F(Γ ⇒ A)). If not, I(Γ, A) is
infinite.
5 Final Remarks
This paper illustrates a methodology to address decidability problems in the simply-typed λ-
calculus which starts by computing a λ-term (through function F) representing the full set of
inhabitants of a given type (using an extension of λ-calculus designed previously by the authors),
and then uses that λ-term to decide the problem at hand.
To carry out this program, we had to introduce our simplified semantics that is loose in the
sense that it does not guarantee that the interpretation of formal fixed-point constructs indeed
denotes a fixed point. This loose semantics can be analyzed very smoothly, and we also identified
the notion of a proper expression where the simplified semantics agrees on formal fixed-point
constructs with the intended semantics in terms of solution spaces. Our finitary representation
function generates proper expressions, and so we can apply the simplified semantics to solve the
original problems.
The predicates with which we analyze the finitary expressions representing sets of inhabitants
are parameterized by a predicate on sequents for the case of fixpoint variables. The interesting
point about our use of this parameter is that, in order to establish decidability, we choose it very
simply (as the empty set), but once we obtained decidability, we can in turn use that predicate
as parameter when building further definitions. In the end, we only need two instances, but we
consider it important—not only in the interest of succinctness—to have identified this abstraction.
We do not claim that our method can confirm sharp complexity results, namely PSPACE-
completeness of INHAB [Sta79] and FINHAB [Hir98]. We are rather interested in having a simple
representation of the full sets of inhabitants, which may have multiple uses, as illustrated by our
counting functions. By “full” we mean in particular that we capture all η-long and β-normal
terms. The restriction to η-long terms is very convenient for a concise description and does not
do much harm to the usability of the results. The concept of co-contraction (Def. 4) is crucial for
completeness of our method in this respect, and as shows our paper, it is not intrusive in practice,
i. e., for the analysis carried out in this paper, its presence is hardly noticed in the proofs.
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Note that other approaches dealing with a full set of inhabitants also face questions. For ex-
ample, in [TAH96], although (finite) context-free grammars suffice to capture inhabitants obeying
the total discharge convention, an infinite grammar is used to capture the full set of β-normal
forms. In [BD05] (Sect. 4.3) a method is presented to produce a context-free grammar to generate
the long normal forms of a type, but the produced grammars seem again to be unable to stay
within the abovementioned optimal complexity. Also, in [SDB15], as a goal is to achieve machines
capable of enumerating all normal inhabitants, and for this, storing a fixed finite number of bound
variable names is not sufficient, automata with a non-standard form of register are used.
We believe our compositional methodology of first building a λ-term (more precisely, a closed
well-bound term in λgfpΣ ) representing the full set of inhabitants of interest, and then traversing
that λ-term to decide whether a given property of that set holds, can be transferred to other
contexts. For example, it would be interesting to know if in the presence of a connective like
disjunction, our methodology produces a (simple) decision function for the INHAB problem.
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A Proofs
Lemma 15. Given a Bo¨hm forest T , exfin(T ) iff nofin(T ) does not hold.
Proof This is plainly an instance of the generic result in the style of De Morgan’s laws that
presents inductive predicates as complements of coinductive predicates, by a dualization operation
on the underlying clauses. The principle is recalled with details now.
Assume a set U (the “universe”) and a function F : P(U)→ P(U) that is monotone, i. e., for
M⊆N ⊆ U , one has F (M) ⊆ F (N ). Then, by Tarski’s fixed-point theorem, there exist the least
fixed-point µF and the greatest fixed-point νF of F , with respect to set inclusion. Moreover, µF
is the intersection of all pre-fixed points M⊆ U of F , i. e., with F (M) ⊆M, and νF is the union
of all post-fixed points M⊆ U of F , i. e., with M⊆ F (M). This lattice-theoretic duality allows
to relate both concepts through complements, with M∁ := U \ M. Given F as before, define a
monotone function F † : P(U)→ P(U) by setting F †(M) := (F (M∁))∁. Then,
µF = (ν(F †))∁ .
This formula (written in logical terms with negation in place of set complement) is often used
to define µF , e. g., in µ-calculus. For a proof, it suffices to consider the inclusion from left to
right (the other direction is obtained by duality, using (F †)† = F ). Since the left-hand side is
included in every pre-fixed point of F , it suffices to show that the right-hand side is such a pre-fixed
point, i. e., F ((ν(F †))∁) ⊆ (ν(F †))∁. We show the contrapositive ν(F †) ⊆ F †(ν(F †)) (using F † as
abbreviation): but ν(F †) is a post-fixed point itself (it is even a fixed point). 
Lemma 36 Let P ∈ {exfin, nofin} and σ ≤ σ′. Then for all Bo¨hm forests T , we have P (T ) iff
P ([σ′/σ]T ).
Lemma 17. For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , 6EF(T ) iff EF(T ) does not hold.
Proof Routine induction on T . In terms of the equivalent recursive definitions of the predicates,
this would have been just an application of De Morgan’s laws. 
Proposition 18 (Finitary characterization). Let P satisfy P ⊆ exfin ◦ S (this is part of the
general proviso on P ).
1. If EFP (T ) then exfin([[T ]]
s).
2. Let T ∈ λgfpΣ be well-bound and proper. If6EFP (T ) and for all X
σ ∈ FPV (T ), exfin(S(σ))
implies P (σ), then nofin([[T ]]s).
Proof 1. is sketched in the main part of the paper.
2. is proved by induction on the predicate 6EFP (which can also be seen as a proof by induction
on T ).
Case T = Xσ. Then ¬P (σ), hence, since Xσ ∈ FPV (T ), by contraposition and Lemma 15,
we get nofin(S(σ)).
Case T = gfpXσ.
∑
iEi. Let N := [[T ]]
s =
∑
i[[Ei]]
s. As T is proper, N = S(σ). We hence
have to show nofin(S(σ)), which we do by an embedded coinduction for the coinductively defined
predicate nofin. We have 6EFP (Ei) for all i and want to use the induction hypothesis, which would
give us nofin([[Ei]]
s) and thus nofin(
∑
i[[Ei]]
s), which was our goal. Fix an i. Of course, Ei is
also well-bound and proper. We have to consider all Y σ
′
∈ FPV (Ei). Either Y σ
′
∈ FPV (T ),
and we are fine by hypothesis, or Y = X and, since T is well-bound, σ ≤ σ′. We just show
that exfin(S(σ′)) does not hold: from our coinductive hypothesis nofin(S(σ)), we get through
Lemma 5 and Lemma 36 even nofin(S(σ′)), and this is the negation of exfin(S(σ′)). This is
a proper application of the coinductive hypothesis since it enters a lemma on nofin that does
not change needed observation depths and then goes into an elimination alternative, where the
occurrences of free fixpoint variables are at least “guarded” by an ordinary variable of a tuple.
The other cases are simple applications of the induction hypothesis.

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Lemma 21 (Sharp finitary characterization). For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , EF⋆(T ) iff exfin([[T ]]
s).
Proof In view of the previous proposition, we only need to consider the direction from right to
left, and we prove its contraposition 6EF⋆(T ) implies nofin([[T ]]s) by induction on the predicate 6EF⋆.
Case T = Xσ. Then ¬exfin(S(σ)) by hypothesis of this case, and this is nofin([[Xσ]]s).
Case T = gfpXσ.
∑
i Ei. Then [[T ]]
s =
∑
i[[Ei]]
s. We have 6EF(Ei) for all i and we use the
induction hypothesis, which gives us nofin([[Ei]]
s) for all i and thus nofin(
∑
i[[Ei]]
s), which was our
goal. Notice that this reasoning does not need further properties of T .
The other cases are likewise simple applications of the induction hypothesis. 
Lemma 23. Given a Bo¨hm forest T , finfin(T ) iff inffin(T ) does not hold.
Proof inffin is defined from finfin by the De Morgan’s law (as recalled in the proof of Lemma 15).
In the first clause for inffin, the proviso exfin(N) is necessary for soundness, and as well the
proviso exfin(Nj) (with i = j) in the last clause. Only through these guards we can ensure that
inffin ⊆ exfin, which is a minimum requirement given what they say in terms of finite membership.
Otherwise, the first clause would allow to derive inffin(N) for the infinite λ-abstraction, satisfying
the equationN = λxA.N for any choice of A and without any relevance of the variable x. Similarly
for the third clause with νN.x〈N〉. 
Lemma 37 Let P ∈ {finfin, inffin} and Γ ≤ Γ′. Then for all Bo¨hm forests T , we have P (T ) iff
P ([Γ′/Γ]T ).
Proposition 25. (Finitary characterization) Let P satisfy P ⊆ finfin ◦ S (this is part of the
general proviso on P ).
1. If FFP (T ) then finfin([[T ]]
s).
2. Let T ∈ λgfpΣ be well-bound and proper. If 6FFP (T ) and for all X
σ ∈ FPV (T ), finfin(S(σ))
implies P (σ), then inffin([[T ]]s).
Proof 1. By induction on FFP (or equivalently by structural induction on T ). We only show the
tuple cases with T = x〈Ni〉i. The other cases are equally simple.
Case for some j, 6EF⋆(Nj). By Lemma 21, nofin([[Nj ]]s), hence finfin(x〈[[Ni]]s〉i), which is
finfin([[T ]]s).
Case for all i, FFP (Ni). By induction hypothesis, finfin([[Ni]]
s) for all i, hence finfin([[x〈Ni〉i]]s).
2. By induction on FFP (or equivalently by structural induction on T ).
Case T = Xσ. Then ¬P (σ), hence, since Xσ ∈ FPV (T ), by contraposition and Lemma 23,
we get inffin(S(σ)).
Case T = x〈Ni〉i. For some j, 6FFP (Nj) and, for all i, EF⋆(Ni). The induction hypothesis is
applicable for Nj since FPV (Nj) ⊆ FPV (T ). Therefore, we have inffin([[Nj ]]s). By Lemma 21,
exfin([[Ni]]
s), for all i, hence, we are done by definition of inffin.
Case T = gfpXσ.
∑
iEi. For some j, 6FFP (Ej). Let N := [[T ]]
s =
∑
i[[Ei]]
s. As T is proper,
N = S(σ). We hence have to show inffin(S(σ)), which we do by an embedded coinduction for the
coinductively defined predicate inffin. We want to use the induction hypothesis for Ej , which would
give us inffin([[Ej ]]
s) and thus inffin(
∑
i[[Ei]]
s), which was our goal. Of course, Ej is also well-bound
and proper. We have to consider all Y σ
′
∈ FPV (Ej). Either Y σ
′
∈ FPV (T ), and we are fine by
hypothesis, or Y = X and, since T is well-bound, σ ≤ σ′. We just show that finfin(S(σ′)) does not
hold: from our coinductive hypothesis inffin(S(σ)), we get through Lemma 5 and Lemma 37 even
inffin(S(σ′)), and this is the negation of finfin(S(σ′)). This is a proper application of the coinductive
hypothesis since it enters a lemma on inffin that does not change needed observation depths and
then goes into an elimination alternative, where the occurrences of free fixpoint variables are at
least “guarded” by an ordinary variable of a tuple.
The case of λ-abstractions is a simple application of the induction hypothesis. 
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We remark that the proposition and its proof are rather analogous to Prop. 18 than dual
to it, although the logical structure of the predicates is rather dual: to enter a fixed point into
FFP , all of the elimination alternatives have to be there already, while for EFP , only one of the
elimination alternatives is required. However, this duality is broken for the tuples: while for EFP ,
all arguments are required to be in the same predicate, FFP has a rule that asks only about one
argument, but for a different predicate, and there is even a second possibility. Anyway, the proof
structure needs to be analogous since exfin and finfin are both inductively defined and therefore
do not admit reasoning by coinduction.
Lemma 33. Let T ∈ HλgfpΣ ∩ 6EF⋆. Then #(T ) = 0.
Proof Induction over 6EF⋆ (or, equivalently, over T ).
Case T = Xσ. Trivial.
Case T = λxA.N . Trivial by induction hypothesis.
Case T = x〈Ni〉i. By induction hypothesis, one of the factors is 0.
Case T = gfpXσ.
∑
iEi. By induction hypothesis, all summands are 0. 
Proposition 34. Let P ⊆ nofin ◦ S and T ∈ HλgfpΣ ∩ FFP . Then #(T ) = #([[T ]]
s).
Proof We will write L and R for left-hand side and right-hand side of the equation to prove. The
proof is by induction on T (or, equivalently, by induction on FFP ).
Case T = Xσ. Then nofin(S(σ)), hence #(S(σ)) = 0 by Lemma 30. Hence, R = 0 = L.
Case T = λxA.N . Then FFP (N). L = #(N). R = #(λx
A.[[N ]]s). According to the definition
of R, we have to distinguish if nofin([[N ]]s) or not. In the first case, by Lemma 30, we have
#([[N ]]s) = 0. Thus, in both case, this gives R = #([[N ]]s), while L = #(N). Done by induction
hypothesis.
Case T = x〈Ni〉i. Subcase 6EF⋆(Nj) for some j. By Lemma 21, nofin([[Nj ]]s). Hence, R = 0.
By Lemma 33, #(Nj) = 0, hence also L = 0 (since one factor is 0).
Subcase FFP (Ni) for all i. We may assume that we are not in the first subcase that has
already been treated, hence EF⋆(Ni) for all i. By Lemma 21, ¬nofin([[Ni]]
s) for all i. Therefore,
R =
∏
i #([[Ni]]
s), while L =
∏
i #(Ni). Done by induction hypothesis for all i.
Case T = gfpXσ.
∑
i Ei. Then FFP (Ei) for all i. Just apply the induction hypothesis to all
the summands and sum up. (Notice how this case becomes the simplest one in our setting with
simplified semantics.) 
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